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The reviewer, in stating the arguments for the continuance of the system, assumes that, because the holders of the purchased commissions receive in pay less than the current interest upon the cost of them, the services of such officers are rendered to the government gratuitously. This is a manifest mistake. The cost of the officer's service to the public treasury is exactly the same as if he had paid nothing for his commission. He pays nothing *to the government*; and although it is true that all the pay to the holder of the commission merely passes through his hands into those of a third person, that pay is no less a charge upon the public, and it goes in the shape of an actual pension to the retiring officer. And this fact leads us to the great and irremovable objection to the purchase system. It converts the actual holder of the commission, the officer for the time being, into a mere pensioner in expectancy. He enters upon his grade as a commission broker; he holds it as tenant for his successor; and he resigns the tenement as soon as he can find one to take it off his hands, at an advance upon his investment. He considers, with much appearance of justice, that the government has no right to impose upon him hard and difficult services for which he can receive nothing. Particularly, he imagines himself rightfully exempt from distant service in war, wherein if he lose his life, that loss is also the annihilation of his property.

One obvious effect of such a system is, to introduce into the army a trading and huckstering spirit which must, in no long course of time, supplant sentiments of chivalrous devotion to country, patriotism, and the *prestige* of arms. Its tendency is to make the officer a popinjay in scarlet plumage, a fashionable loungeur, who declines in due course into the insipid habitue of the club-room, the gourmande, the wine-bibber, and the card-player. It is hard on the poor officer who cannot buy his way up. It is, indeed, about as well adapted to enervate the military character of a nation by corrupting and enfeebling its army, as could well be devised. Its inevitable results are indifference and inefficiency in the officers, and contempt and disobedience on the part of the men.

OUR OWN WAR EXPENSES.

FROM the general appropriations recently made by our Congress, amounting in all to \$63,604,023, we cull the following sums for our current war expenses, viz :

FOR THE ARMY AND ITS ACCOMPANIMENTS:

Army proper.....	\$10,586,249
Armories, arsenals and munitions of war.....	985,049
Military academy.....	173,894
Fortifications and other works of defence.....	1,745,300
Surveys, &c.....	135,000
Miscellaneous objects.....	1,400,000
Arrearages.....	2,000
Compensation of the Secretary of War, clerks and employees.....	106,300
Contingent expenses of the War Department...	29,160
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	\$15,162,952

FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE NAVY:

Navy proper.....	8,142,418
Marine corps.....	851,113
Special objects.....	4,530,974
Compensation of the Secretary of the Navy, clerks and employees.....	97,540
Contingent expenses of the Navy Department...	12,565
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	\$13,634,610

OTHER MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES:

For interest on public debt.....	2,230,000
For arming and equipping the militia.....	200,000
For the payment of pensions.....	1,458,947
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	\$3,888,947
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	\$32,686,509

Here is an aggregate of nearly thirty-three million dollars, more than half the general expenses of our government, for purposes connected with our war-system. Can any one tell us the real need or use of such enormous expenditures? What equivalent do they render? What good have they done, or are likely ever to do, in return for so many millions squandered every year for their support?

We do not propose any answer ourselves to these questions now; but we think they deserve, and must in time receive, an earnest and emphatic answer, from the people on whom all such burdens eventually fall. We deem them, for the most part, entirely superfluous; and for less than a tithe of what is worse than wasted on our army and navy in a time of peace, we might secure all the good they do, without their evil. There is in truth little need for either; and their place, if they were not utterly discarded, might easily be supplied by other and far better means of public security.

We commend this subject to the attention of thoughtful men, and hope ere long to find some of our ablest and best statesmen devoting themselves to this wide and far-reaching reform. Hardly any of them have hitherto given it serious heed; but they seem to have followed, with little inquiry or thought, in the beaten path of immemorial, unquestioned precedent. We must of course have law duly enforced for the security of society; but for this purpose we have little or no need of a fleet or an army. We might have the requisite force in some other way; a police, either on land or sea, that would be in the long run more effectual for private and public security.